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*

Malcolm Gladwell explored the way certain ideas and behav
iors can proliferate "just like viruses do" once they achieve a critical
mass in The Tipping Point,l his best-seller about the sorts of wide
spread and rapidly adopted social phenomena he labels epidemics.
Gladwell's subtitle, "How Little Things Can Make a Big Differ
ence," indicates that he thinks it need not take much to get one of
these social epidemics rolling. He does believe, however, that three
factors are essential: getting "people with a particular and rare set
of social gifts" involved? packaging the ideas so they are "irresist
ible" under the circumstances,3 and making sure that both the right
people and the right presentation can be deployed in the perfect
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; Professor of Public
Health, Boston University School of Public Health; and Professor of Health Care Man
agement, Boston University School of Management.
1. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITrLE THINGS CAN MAKE
A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000).
2. [d. at 33 (the example he cites is the success of Paul Revere on his Midnight
Ride).
3. [d. at 132 (his example is the stunning success of Sesame Street in helping chil
dren's learning).
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context for change. 4 That usually means inheriting or creating a
situation where one can "tinker[] with the smallest details of the
immediate environment" to unleash the idea's potential for reach
ing a tipping point, and thus morph into an epidemic leading to
change. 5
As I thought about tying the six thought-provoking essays in
cluded in this Symposium on The Politics of Health Law together
under some sort of unifying theme, Gladwell's theories kept coming
back to me. How would the issues these distinguished authors ad
dress-the Schiavo imbroglio, the constitutionality or criminality of
palliative care, organ donation from minors, medical tourism and
outsourcing, the way political ideology affects health care access,
and pending federal legislation to expand individual insurance
fare when examined through the lens of Gladwell's analytical theo
ries? Are any of the health care issues explored in this Symposium
heading for the kind of tipping point that might change the way
society traditionally grapples with them? The more I thought about
using this organizing theme for knitting these seemingly disparate
essays together, the more I came to view the articles as sorting
themselves onto a continuum moving away from a theoretical po
tential for tipping point status, depending on how many of Glad
well's three conditions for epidemic status were present. Whether
Tipping Point theory really has anything predictive to say about the
future course of these issues I cannot say, but the exercise has been
an interesting way to tease apart their differences.
Once a tipping point is reached, mere possibilities or exhorta
tions for change can gain momentum and become transformed into
full-blown new ways of handling problems. In extraordinary cases,
unleashing "epidemic potential" can work paradigm shifts in the
way people think and behave about health care issues. The famous
health care tipping point that first leaps to mind concerns the radi
cal transformation occasioned by the launch of Britain's National
Health Service. 6 After a century of tinkering with hospital reform
on the local level, Big Bang health care change came almost all at

4. Id. at 139-46 (here his case in point involved cleaning up New York City graffiti
and broken windows to trigger the decline of violent crime during the 1990s).
5. [d. at 146.
6. See generally CHARLES WEBSTER, THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE: A POLlT·
ICAL HISTORY (1998).
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once to Britain when the central government officially assumed
ownership of the nation's public hospitals on July 5, 1948.7
Radical structural reform was accomplished so swiftly and
completely in Post-War Britain because many factors coalesced, in
cluding experience during the government's unavoidable takeover
of hospitals while hostilities were continuing. But once peacetime
came, the efforts of just one man, Labour's politically adroit and
extraordinarily persuasive Minister of Health, Aneurin Bevan, were
key to public and political acceptance of fundamental structural
change. 8 By way of contrast, the Clinton Health Care reforms went
down to defeat in flames in the mid-1990s, despite a charismatic and
persuasive national leader elected at least in part on his pledge to
reform our health insurance system, primarily because they were
presented in a complicated form and dialogue that amounted to the
antithesis of irresistible packaging. 9
A more successful example of American Tipping Point behav
ior concerns the transformation of the Veterans Administration
hospital network from the scorned stepchild of U.S. hospital sys
tems lO into an institution delivering "top-notch healthcare"ll in lit
tle more than a decade. 12 An energetic and persuasive Under
Secretary for Health, Kenneth Kizer, led the transformation begin
ning in the mid-1990s with publication of a vision statement 13 and a
road map for accomplishing reform. 14 But the factor th&t made
transformation irresistible was that Kizer managed to convince eve
ryone concerned that the system either had to change or die. The
VA's 200,000 employees came to understand that their jobs were at
7. See generally GEOFFREY RIVETI, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LONDON HOSPI·
TAL SYSTEM 1823-1982 (1986).
8. Id. at 264-78.
9. Daniel Yankelovich, The Debate That Wasn't: The Public and the Clinton Plan,
HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 7, 7-23.
10. For a negative portrayal of VA health care, see the Oscar-winning movie
BORN ON THE FOURTH OF JULY (Universal Studios 1989).
11. Christopher J. Gearon, Military Might: Today's VA Hospitals are Models of
Top-Notch Care, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 18, 2005, at 100-06 (appearing as part
of the annual special report, America's Best Hospitals).
12. Jonathan B. Perlin, Guest Editorial, Transformation of the U.S. Veterans
Health Administration, 1 HEALTH ECON. POL. & L. 99 (2006); Gilbert M. Gaul, Re
vamped Veterans' Health Care Now a Model, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2005, at AI, availa
ble at 2005 WLNR 13195602 (Westlaw).
13. KENNETH KIZER, VISION FOR CHANGE: A PLAN TO RESTRUCTURE THE VET
ERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (1995).
14. KENNETH KIZER, PRESCRIPTION FOR CHANGE: THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES
AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES UNDERLYING THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE VETERANS
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM (1996).
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stake if, for example, they did not facilitate a switch to electronic
medical records. Electronic records in turn permitted performance
measurement and systems improvement. Little changes like that
were the key to massive progress for the whole enterprise. All
three of Gladwell's essential factors coalesced to constitute the tip
ping point that set the VA improvement epidemic in motion.
Among these Symposium articles, my most plausible candidate
for Tipping Point status in the foreseeable future is examined in
Professor Kathy L. Cerminara's Collateral Damage: The Aftermath
of the Political Culture Wars in Schiavo. 1s Professor Cerminara
delves deeply into the dismaying facts surrounding the politically
postponed death of Terri Schiavo as "an example of a more general
politicization of bioethics."16 In so doing, she illuminates how very
strongly the majority of the American public reacted against out
sider and government intrusion into what it regards as the intensely
personal dying process. Cerminara describes the near-incredible
saga of the Schiavo case as it made its tortuous journey through
state and federal courts and legislatures, ultimately attracting the
official involvement17 of both a governor and a sitting President.1 8
The full impact of what transpired on the route toward obtaining
the release this powerless woman sought from a sadly diminished
life makes for chilling reading indeed. 19
Professor Cerminara then probes the aftermath of Schiavo to
see what lessons can be drawn from its tragic facts for individuals,
for "the tone and pattern of end-of-life decisions,"2o for bioethics,
and about our "constitutional republican form of government. "21
Her exploration of these issues leads her to conclude that because
of the Schiavo case's very high visibility in the media, "it height
ened citizens' awareness"22 of the possibility that a person's end-of
life wishes can be politically thwarted, and by outsiders at that. It
thus propelled the right-to-die issue into public consciousness in a
15. See Kathy L. Cerminara, Collateral Damage: The Aftermath of the Political
Culture Wars in Schiavo, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 279 (2007).
16. !d. at 289.
17. The majority of the American public viewed this as meddling, not mere
"involvement. "
18. That these men happened to be brothers is not unrelated [pun intended].
19. This essay takes as a given that, as her husband maintained and as every court
which examined the facts found, Terri Schiavo would not have wanted to continue liv
ing under the circumstances of her irreversible medical condition.
20. Cerminara, supra note 16, at 289.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 307.
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way that might make political interference in such inherently pri
vate decisions far less likely in the future.
If we apply Gladwell's criteria to the Schiavo situation, Terri
Schiavo's unsought celebrity-the ubiquity of her picture in the me
dia for months on end as the drama played out-transformed her
into a mute but highly effective spokeswoman for others sharing
her sad predicament. The fact that she could not speak for herself
was the very thing that made her so charismatic as a poster child for
personal autonomy, the right to choose to let life go at the point
where we are most helpless to accomplish it on our own. Secondly,
members of the public could identify easily with the plight of an
attractive young woman plunged suddenly into a physical and
mental limbo where she could no longer speak, hear, think, feel, or
rebel. Most people identifying with her condition believed that had
they been in the same situation they, too, would have chosen
"death as a management option."23 In other words, the right-to-die
dilemma emblazoned itself onto public consciousness in a frame
work that made its intellectual and emotional appeal very hard to
resist.
Finally, the context in which these end-of-life decision points
arise is usually below the public radar screen-notwithstanding
Terri Schiavo's very public travails-and the case itself made clear
that the future prospects of successful interference in a death that it
can at least be reasonably inferred a patient would want under the
circumstances, are exceedingly slim. This, and the fact that death
and-dying situations ordinarily arise in highly private circumstances,
make it less likely that such a public travesty will play out again in
the near future. In this case, tipping point analysis would point to
ward a reduction in outsider interference and a corresponding in
crease in public confidence that these personal and painful
decisions according substance and credence to personal autonomy,
will continue to be respected.
Professor Stephen Arons in a sense both foreshadows and am
plifies the Schiavo controversies as he sounds a note of serious con
cern with his Article, Palliative Care in the U.S. Healthcare System:
Constitutional Right or Criminal Act?24 Focusing on the ideological
23. Cf John A. Robertston, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A
Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1975) (analyzing the dilemma confronted by
parents who choose not to seek routine surgical or medical care for babies born with
other severe developmental disabilities).
24. See Stephen Arons, Palliative Care in the U.S. Healthcare System: Constitu
tional Right or Criminal Act?, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 309 (2007).
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polarization he states has led to a depressing state of "acceptable
collateral damage of the culture wars," Professor Arons warns
about our increasing propensity for turning private medical deci
sions into "intemperate and ill-informed public struggle[s],"25 Most
specifically, he is concerned about unwarranted interference in
those situations where terminal patients have decided to eschew
life-sustaining medical intervention and seek only palliative mea
sures. This interference was exemplified by the former U.S. Attor
ney General's threat to use his powers under the Controlled
Substances Act 26 to examine physicians' intent in prescribing con
trolled substances to terminal patients.
Professor Arons theorizes that the principle of personal auton
omy "is being deconstructed ... to promote beneficent paternalism
or to advance concepts . . . held by various religious or interest
groups."27 He examines the landmark Cruzan,28 Glucksberg,29 and
Qidlpo cases to tease out the constitutional implications of adminis
tering palliative care that could hasten the death of terminal pa
tients in the course of relieving pain. He also criticizes state and
federal initiatives-including the report of President Bush's Com
mission on Bioethics31 -that would interfere with the physician-pa
tient relationship in terminal situations. His overall perspective is
wary and cautionary about the prospect that widely accepted con
stitutional liberties will be eroded.
If one applied Malcolm Gladwell's Tipping Point theory to
Professor Arons's analysis, the first question would have to be:
"From which direction are we viewing palliative care as a prob
lem?" Stating the question that way probably tips the answer as
well. On neither side of the issue do there appear to be "people
with a particular and rare set of social gifts" who can motivate
enough others to jump onto the palliative care bandwagon-either
way-to set an epidemic in motion. John Ashcroft, the Attorney
General who tried to use the Controlled Substances Act to under
cut Oregon's Death with Dignity Act,32 would no longer seem to fit
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
IN OUR

Id. at 309.
21 U.S.c. §§ 801-904 (2000).
Arons, supra note 24, at 312.
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, TAKING CARE: ETHICAL CAREGIVING
SOCIETY (2005), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/takin~care/

takin~care.pdf.
32. OR. REV. STAT.

§§ 127.800-.897 (2005).
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the bill-if he ever did. 33 Moreover, it would be hard to package
either side of the issue in a way that would make it seem irresistible
to enough people to get the ball rolling.
Physician-assisted suicide is still highly controversial, yet
prohibiting doctors from trying to relieve the pain of their patients'
terminal illnesses would offend large segments of the population. 34
Nonetheless, the context in which most palliative care decisions are
made is not usually likely to attract public attention, and double
effect palliative treatment has in fact been medically commonplace,
albeit low-profile, for many decades. 35 Because Gladwell's three
Tipping Point factors point in inconsistent directions here, the palli
ative care issue does not seem poised for epidemic movement in
either direction-at least not at the present time. If, however, a
compelling factual situation arose wherein a patient sympathetic
and famous enough to put an identifiable face on the issue were
forced to suffer because palliative care was denied, I could envision
public momentum building toward a tipping point for the kind of
legal clarification that would bring above-board social acceptance
for this right-to-die issue.
Professor Michele Goodwin's Essay My Sister's Keeper?: Law,
Children, and Compelled Donation,36 tackles the bioethical under
pinnings of compelling organ and tissue donation from children.
The title and the foregoing sentence read literally as semantic ox
ymorons, and Professor Goodwin intends us to think of her subject
that way. Compulsion and donation are linguistically opposed con
cepts, yet most readers familiar with cases involving minors as or
gan and tissue donors are conditioned not to take those words
literally. Goodwin seeks to shake her readers into analyzing exactly
what is at stake when we use children-compel them to donate
parts of their physical selves-for the purpose of medical interven
tions designed solely to help others, even though we usually dis
guise that compulsion in best-interests terminology.
33. David Sclar, U.S. Supreme Court Ruling in Gonzales v. Oregon Upholds the
Oregon Death With Dignity Act, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 639, 639 (2006).
34. See, e.g., Hospice Patients Alliance, Pain Control: Methods and Standards of
Care, http://hospicepatients.orglhospic29.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2007) ("Most pa
tients and families who use hospice services expect that the hospice will make every
effort to relieve the pain which afflicts their loved one.").
35. Cf Daniel P. Sulmasy, Commentary, The Rule of Double Effect: Clearing Up
the Double Talk, 159 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 545 (1999).
36. See Michele Goodwin, My Sister's Keeper?: Law, Children, and Compelled
Donation, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 357 (2007).
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Donation is a volitional concept, whereas compulsion requires
the application of force-volition's opposite-to achieve its objec
tives. The public is not conditioned to think that courts and loving
parents lawfully apply force to remove physical parts of children's
bodies solely for other people's benefit, but Professor Goodwin's
article requires us to confront the fact that best-interests rhetoric
often obscures that uncomfortable truth. Her extensive examina
tion reveals that the rationales traditionally trotted out to justify
taking tissue and organs from children for the medical rescue of
third parties on the basis of parental consent stem from cases in
volving the mentally deficient and mentally ill. The best-interests
justification simply does not stand up well to searching legal or ethi
cal analysis where child donors are involved.
Goodwin would proscribe taking organs from children younger
than age thirteen altogether, always appoint a guardian ad litem to
protect the interests of those prospective minor donors older than
thirteen, and require family and independent counseling for the
prospective donor and parents, to force them to understand both
the immediate and the longer run physical and psychological impli
cations of their actions. She would also require an independent
physician for the prospective donor. Finally, she would require pro
spective minor donors to explain to the court their reasons for
wanting to make such extraordinarily altruistic gestures. Presuma
bly if those statements were not sufficiently persuasive-volitional
in fact?-judicial approval for their "donations" would not be
granted. Professor Goodwin acknowledges that her proposal would
shrink the available pool of minor donors, but she intends that re
sult. She wants to push us toward a tipping point that will force
reconsideration of our "altruistically based procurement regime."37
How close are we to the point of rethinking compelled organ
and tissue donations from children whose parents consent in their
"best interests"? Probably not very close if we apply Gladwell's
Tipping Point criteria. In the first place, no advocate with the ex
traordinary social skills needed to move the cause to public promi
nence has thus far emerged. Nor does compelled donation from
minors usually arise in a context ripe for Gladwell's little changes
that could set an epidemic for rethinking the legal response in mo
tion. Moreover, situations conducive to compelling donation from
minors tend to arise rarely, privately, and in isolation from one an
other. Where the potential donor's parents are in accord on supply
37.

Id. at 404.
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ing consent for the donation in the presumed best interests of their
child, we are not likely to see high-profile portrayals of the situation
as the kind of child exploitation merely for the benefit of another
that would become one of Gladwell's irresistible spurs to public
action.
To the contrary in fact; the media spotlight has been primarily
on appealing patients-often children-in desperate need of rescue
via tissue or organ donation from others, rather than on their po
tential rescuers.38 When the potential rescuer is a Good Samaritan
child 'asked' to undergo an inherently dangerous medical proce
dure but unable to give legal consent on her own, and no proffered
benefit to her can stand up to critical evaluation, the public-and
legal-reaction might be different if a passionate advocate ap
peared on her behalf. One could imagine a compelling set of facts
that would shift the mind-set of an American public more condi
tioned to embrace technological intervention framed in the best in
terests of a child who can facilitate it by donating "non-essential"
bodily tissue, than to question the donation's ethical ambiguities.
But bringing the issue to public consciousness would still require
skilled advocacy, and when the parents supply consent supporting
the donation, outsiders have trouble being perceived as carrying
moral authority to intervene on the child's behalf.
Professor Barry Furrow's pull-no-punches Essay, Access to
Health Care and Political Ideology: Wouldn't You Really Rather
Have a Pony?,39 constitutes a forthright plea for ideological change
to "repair our system from the top down."4o Professor Furrow be
gins by rehearsing the well-known high costs (an "epidemic" itself
in Gladwell's phraseology) and in many cases questionable quality
of the health care delivered in this country. He then zeroes right in
on the access problems that permeate our system to terrify those
without health insurance, and to worry many others who have cov
erage now, but fear it is either inadequate or they will lose it alto
gether in the future. In a wonderful turn of both phrase and
metaphor, he muses that "a large part of the population want[s] to
38. See, e.g., Kyla Dunn, Cloning Trevor, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2002, at 31
52 (telling the story, complete with cover photograph, of an extremely appealing little
boy suffering from adrenoleukodystrophy, "a rare and underdiagnosed genetic
disorder").
39. See Barry Furrow, Access to Health Care and Political Ideology: Wouldn't
You Really Rather Have a Pony?, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 405 (2007).
40. [d. at 406.
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age more rapidly, a perverse quest for the Fountain of Age,"41 in
order to become Medicare-eligible and thus sure of guaranteed
coverage.
Professor Furrow's real target in this piece is the siren song of
choice market theorists aver that competition brings to health care,
along with its much-vaunted efficiency and reduced waste. He ex
poses the hollowness of choice rhetoric for those with limited or
non-existent health insurance, and considers it a serious "stumbling
block" to improving access to care. He also considers choice rheto
ric "cartoonish" because of its strong superficial appeal to the indi
vidual in all of us, which in turn makes us resist questioning the
value of what we really get in the way of options. What Furrow
really wants is for us to question the market ideology on which
much of our current health policy rests.
How do Professor Furrow's ideas fare when subjected to Mal
colm Gladwell's Tipping Point factors? Not very well, I'm afraid.
For better or for worse, competition principles structure our health
care delivery system, and Furrow seeks nothing less than to change
the "rooted ideology" that brought market theories to medicine.
That's a tall order-one could even call it tilting at a windmill these
days-and no champion with "exceptionally persuasive social
skills" appears anxious to take on that task. President Clinton
might have done it when he was first elected with what most
thought was a mandate to reform health care, but as noted previ
ously, the Clintons blew the opportunity and the moment passed.
One could argue that presenting universal coverage reform in
humanitarian terms, augmented by hard data about the human and
financial costs of inadequate access to health care, could attract ad
herents in the manner of one of Gladwell's irresistible ideas. How
ever, that idea would have to come up head-to-head against the
health care choice rhetoric already shown to be extremely hard for
most Americans to resist. Moreover, the concept of greater choice
is quite simple for most people to grasp, whereas universal coverage
has many moving parts that have to be coordinated before it could
be implemented. This makes it much more difficult for the public
to understand and thus espouse the cause.
Finally, we do not yet (or again?) have the perfect context for
change Gladwell believes is necessary to set fundamental structural
change in motion for health care. Everyone realizes our health care
system has many problem areas, but the public does not perceive
41.

/d. at 408.
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these as part of larger systemic failures. It certainly does not view
these problems as the sort that challenge our ideological predilec
tions and cry out for structural reform. No one realizes that more
clearly than Professor Furrow, but he is in no frame of mind to give
up on the effort. He believes that ideology can be remade, and that
most people would probably be willing to swap a little choice-the
pony, if you will-for better health if they really understood what
the stakes were.
The subject matter Professor Nicolas Terry explores in Under
Regulated Health Care Phenomena in a Flat World: Medical Tour
ism and Outsourcing,42 is probably among the least likely issues ex
amined in this Symposium to attract Tipping Point treatment any
time soon. The (mostly) international health care transactions he
analyzes generally operate so far beneath the radar screen of public
perception that few people are aware of them, let alone consider
them a problem in need of better regulation. Professor Terry exam
ines the behind-the-scenes re-structuring of health care going on de
facto when patients travel, often to other countries, to get medical
services, and when insurers and providers outsource medically re
lated ancillary services to foreign venues. The common motivation
for both phenomena is the universal search for lower health care
costs, and in a small but growing number of cases those practices
overlap when domestic payors actively promote medical tourism for
their insureds.
Professor Terry sets forth chapter and verse documenting the
past decade's explosion of medical tourism and ancillary medical
service outsourcing. Defining medical tourism as "treatments or
surgery that have been planned in advance to take place outside a
patient's usual place of residence,"43 he observes that much of this
travel reverses prior trends and moves from affluent countries to
those where labor costs are cheaper but no less professional. Thus
certain foreign countries (South Africa, India, Mexico, Thailand,
and Indonesia, for example) have promoted themselves as dual
purpose destinations, providing high quality medical and dental ser
vices, plus a vacation before or after you have received care.
With regard to medical outsourcing of non-clinical work, many
foreign countries (India, Israel, and Pakistan, for instance) can offer
not only cheaper costs but a highly skilled workforce accustomed to
42. See Nicolas P. Terry. Under-Regulated Health Care Phenomena in a Flat
World: Medical Tourism and Outsourcing, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 421 (2007).
43. [d. at 422.
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providing around-the-clock transcription, IT, medical interpretation
(reading EKGs and radiology scans), and other services needed by
health care insurers and (usually institutional) providers. Professor
Terry tells us medical outsourcing is not only increasing rapidly, but
expanding in scope to include such high-level functions as strategic
planning, pharmaceutical benefits management, and systems
design.
The problem with all of this foreign involvement in U.S. medi
cal care is that much of it takes place in a physical and political
context that makes it extremely difficult to regulate effectively.
Noting that the United States does not even have national licensing
for physicians, Terry reminds us of the problems that Internet pre
scribing presents for intra-state regulation, let alone attempting to
regulate physician services internationally. Quality of care, clinical
trials, and the privacy and confidentiality of medical information
are but three other areas where trying to regulate the bioethical,
cost, quality, and other aspects of health care internationally consti
tutes a legal and logistical nightmare for all concerned. In Terry's
matter-of-fact words, "Outsourcing is essentially unregulated and is
likely to remain that way."44 That summation pretty much fore
closes any tipping point inquiry on my part. None of Gladwell's
three factors are present to indicate any potential for imminent so
cial change, so in the short run we will just continue to muddle
through. Perhaps some major catastrophe-or stunning success
will transpire to focus public attention on these extra-territorial and
essentially unregulated phenomena, but the global nature of any
attempt to Make Things Better makes that possibility accordingly
harder to accomplish.
Finally, Professor Elizabeth Pendo's submission to this Sympo
sium, The Health Care Choice Act: The Individual Insurance Market
and the Politics of "Choice" ,45 is my candidate for the subject mat
ter its author would least like to see come to a tipping point. Given
the recent congressional election results, putting Democrats in con
trol of both the House and the Senate, I predict she will get her
wish-at least in the short run. Professor Pendo's Article analyzes
pending federal legislation, The Health Care Choice Act of 2005
(the Act),46 designed to permit health insurers to market individual
44. Id. at 470.
45. See Elizabeth Pendo, The Health Care Choice Act: The Individual Insurance
Market and the Politics of "Choice", 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 473 (2007).
46. Health Care Choice Act of 2005, H.R. 2355, 109th Congo (2005); Health Care
Choice Act of 2005, S. 1015, 109th Congo (2005).
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policies approved in any state without having to comply with any
additional regulatory strictures imposed by the insured's state of
residence. In essence, the Act enables insurers to market (presum
ably cheaper) individual policies without having to comply with the
benefits that may be mandated by the state in which they want to
sell their product. Thus, under the Act, a policy now marketed in
California without infertility treatment benefits, for example, could
be sold in Massachusetts without that coverage as well, even though
Massachusetts (but not California) mandates that infertility cover
age 47 be offered by all insurers currently doing business in the
Commonwealth.
Professor Pendo acknowledges the grave obstacles the unin
sured of this country must surmount in order to obtain and pay for
non-group health insurance, but she makes a persuasive case that
the Act is hardly the solution for that problem. She shows that not
only will the cost of coverage for these individual policies be un
likely to fall, but that they are also unlikely to increase access to
medical services or offer adequate benefits to most subscribers who
purchase them either. As was the case with Professor Furrow's arti
cle, Professor Pendo's real target here is the illusion of individual
choice and freedom that the plan's proponents utilize to sell their
idea. She believes that free choice rhetoric appealing to a benefici
ary's self-interest is fundamentally at odds with the social solidarity
underpinnings of insurance that make it such an effective risk
spreading mechanism for the ordinary subscriber.
I do not think Professor Pendo needs to worry that we are any
where near a tipping point that would transform the Act she op
poses into the law of the land. Recent changes in the political
control of Congress should see to that, for choice rhetoric and indi
vidual responsibility for obtaining health insurance are not usually
considered touchstones of the Democratic Party's approach to
health care policy. Moreover, the Act's presentation certainly has
not arrived in packaging that would be irresistible to most unin
sured people who lack resources to buy ordinary health insurance,
nor has an effective and charismatic spokesperson appeared to pro
pel the idea to public prominence among others. Finally, the pre
sent context in which the idea would have to gain momentum
simply is not charged enough with regard to health insurance
problems to produce this kind of incremental change. Those with
out insurance constitute a small and relatively powerless interest
47.
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group, and those who have it are as a group relatively indifferent
despite rhetoric to the contrary by many-about making coverage
more widely available for others. Moreover, no powerful interest
groups would seem to see their fortunes improve enough, were the
bill passed, to invest in making that happen. There simply is not
enough political juice currently in the issue to get this particular ball
rolling toward enactment at the present time-a Very Good Thing
in Professor Pendo's eyes.
So there you have it with regard to these essays and Tipping
Point analysis. Although Malcolm Gladwell believes it does not
have to take much to get an epidemic for social change moving, it
does take a very special set of circumstances to produce a health
care tipping point. I hope this exercise has shown that those cir
cumstances are not so easy to come by where health care transfor
mations are concerned-a reality that we probably all know
instinctively. But we do have many thoughtful and creative schol
ars, such as those whose articles appear in this Symposium, working
to help us understand, illuminate, and resolve our continuing health
care problems.

